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Summary
Our introduction to the volume sets the discussion about memory in archaeology into cur-
rent contexts, establishes our reasons for producing this book and discusses a number of
crucial aspects of memory, space, and identity. We provide a brief history of memory stud-
ies with a focus on contributions from archaeology and discuss a number of topics that play
important roles in the papers. These include the relations between forgetting and remem-
bering, and between space, place and memory. Along with our authors, we emphasize that
memory is a matter of practices, not just of mindsets. A further element in our discussions
is the interface between memory, duration, and history. All of these issues coalesce in an
important background theme, the political nature of various modes of memory.
Keywords: Memory; cultural memory; realms of memory; Pierre Nora; forgetting.
In der Einführung des vorliegenden Sammelbands werden die Diskussionen über Erinne-
rung in der Archäologie in gegenwärtige Kontexte eingeordnet, unsere Beweggründe für
die Herausgabe dieses Buches dargelegt und einige zentrale Aspekte von Erinnerung, Raum
und Identität diskutiert. Neben einem kurzen Überblick zur Geschichte der Gedächtnisfor-
schung mit einem Schwerpunkt auf den archäologischen Studien werden eine Reihe von
Themen angesprochen, die in den Aufsätzen des vorliegenden Bandes eine wichtige Rolle
spielen. Dies betrifft unter anderem das Verhältnis von Vergessen und Erinnern sowie Be-
ziehungen zwischen Raum, Ort und Erinnerung. In Einklang mit unseren AutorInnen be-
tonen wir, dass Erinnerung eine Frage der Praktiken ist, nicht nur der Denkweisen. Ein wei-
teres Element in unseren Diskussionen ist die Verbindung von Erinnerung, Fortbestehen
und Geschichte. All diese Aspekte wirken zusammen bei einem diesen zugrundeliegenden
wichtigen Thema: der politischen Natur verschiedener Arten der Erinnerung.
Keywords: Erinnerung; kulturelles Gedächtnis; Erinnerungswelten; Pierre Nora; Verges-
sen.
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ǟ Introduction
The Ǡǟst century develops into an epoch of the erasure of archaeological sites. This
started (in)famously in ǠǞǞǟ with the destruction of the Buddhas in Bamiyan and con-
tinuedwith the looting of the IraqMuseum in ǠǞǞǡ, up to theMarch ǠǞǟǣ destruction of
large parts of archaeological sites in northern Iraq: Nimrud, Nineveh and Hatra. Events
of August ǠǞǟǣ give us urgent reasons to rethink these relations further: Khaled al As-
sad, an archaeologist whoworked at Palmyra in Syria, was brutally murdered by ‘Islamic
State’ representatives because he was an archaeologist. Memory, its material basis and the
claims over its interpretation have become life-threatening issues in some corners of the
world. The relations between speciﬁc places and their potential to evoke memories, be-
tween monuments and the histories that surround them, between material traces of the
past and the political interests that led to their survival almost take a backseat in the face
of murderous hatred against representatives of the archaeological profession. What are
the consequences when current destructions are prosecuted as war crimes? How should
perpetrators be treated? Is there a need for more international codes to protect ‘world
cultural heritage’?
Despite justiﬁed condemnations of murderous groups for whom archaeological
work is a crime, we should distance ourselves from visceral reactions. We should be
careful not to equate iconoclasm simply withWahhabi Islam, ormuch oldermovements
such as ancient Mesopotamian defacements,1 Roman damnatio memoriae and Byzantine
iconoclasm.2 Wanton destruction of religious and/or memory sites has a long history
in modern Western Europe, on a much grander scale than we witness today: the Nazi
pogrom of November ǟǧǡǦ led to the murder of hundreds of people, but it was at the
same time a cultural eradication of hitherto seldom seen proportions, leading to the
complete destruction of more than ǟǢǞǞ synagogues.
The fascist rampage, but also the more recent acts of cultural destruction are para-
doxical events. They are meant to destroy memories by erasing their material anchors,
whether of an individual, as in the case of shrines of Islamic saints in present-day North-
ern Iraq, Syria or Mali, of whole religions, for example in the ǟǧǡǦ November pogroms,
or of a speciﬁc part of history, as in the cases of Nimrud, Nineveh and Hatra, but also
in the Israeli-Palestinian struggle.3 However, the intentional act of material annihila-
tion often radically intensiﬁes memories connected to a particular site.4 The valley of
Bamiyan was known to only a few people before the dynamiting of the huge Buddha
statues. Nowadays, this voided heritage has become world famous exactly because of
its destruction. Nimrud and Hatra are even less likely to have been known, but have
1 May ǠǞǟǠ.
2 See Brubaker ǠǞǟǠ.
3 Abu el Haj ǠǞǞǟ.
4 Pollock ǠǞǟǤ.
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now become symbols of the will to eliminate a speciﬁc past. With that awareness of
an intended destruction, the knowledge about what was supposed to be wiped out is
strongly reinforced. The latter effect is further boosted by the conscious staging of prac-
tices of defacement, a theatricality that has become a hallmark of the Islamic State’s acts
of de-culturation.5
The place of the World Trade Center, an otherwise unimaginative modernist high
rise, has become a symbol for American deﬁance, and even the now dismantled Palace of
the Republic of theGermanDemocratic Republic is often evoked positively in discussions
about the current reconstruction of Berlin’s ǟǧth century imperial palace. Destruction
of culturally and mnemonically important sites mostly magniﬁes what it is supposed to
erase: memory.
Nevertheless, we witness a new quality in the ravaging of places since the turn of
the millennium. The attempt of the Taliban and the ‘Islamic State’ at ruining of ruins,
instead of places that are fully integrated into a lifeworld is a new phenomenon. The
obliteration of Jewish synagogues, Byzantine church paintings, statues of Lenin,6 the
Palace of the Republic, or the monuments of and for Saddam Hussein were all part of
attempts to destroy belief systems anchored in the minds of people who performed affir-
mative rituals in and around them. These sites all had well-deﬁned ideological functions
that had implications for collective memory.
The case of ruins and archaeological sites is more complex. “All we are breaking
are stones”7 was the comment of Mullah Omar when interviewed about the cultural
values of the monuments the Taliban had blown up. Generalizing from this statement,
one could say that not all cultures are open to the notion of ‘heritage’, not to speak
of ‘world heritage’. A belief in a connection between an unchangeable past as a back-
ground to present identities is not universal, nor can it perhaps be universalized. Still,
the Taliban’s actions against the Buddha statues were a contradiction in terms: if it was
just stones, then why bother to blow them up at all? Mullah Omar’s interpretation of
the dynamiting of two statues as accelerating the decay of meaningless matter stands in
sharp contrast to the Taliban’s idea that there was a danger of idol worship inherent in
the statues, announced on other occasions as a reason for the violent acts against the
already dilapidated ﬁgures in Bamiyan.8 In contrast, the ‘Islamic State’ seems simply to
select themost prominentmonuments in order to gainmaximal publicity and to rile the
West. Indeed, the blown-up Palmyra arch of Septimius Severus, a structure without any
religious signiﬁcance or even depictions of human beings was publicized as ‘World her-
itage’ (and thus part of ‘our’, Western past). This event has gained much more publicity
than the annihilation of numerous local Christian, Yazidi or Shi’a shrines that are likely
5 Falser ǠǞǟǞ; Shaw ǠǞǟǣ.
6 Kramer ǟǧǧǠ; Verdery ǟǧǧǧ.
7 Siri ǠǞǞǠ, ǟǞǥ.
8 Bernbeck ǠǞǟǞ.
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to be far more important to the inhabitants of the area and, like the Tomb of Jonah in
Niniveh, served as memory sites for members of several different religions co-inhabiting
the region. In the latter case, it is presumably also this memory of peaceful co-existence
that the ‘Islamic State’ seeks to erase.
The present destructions of monumentalized memory have deeper implications.
Conﬂicts over the past, its material remains and the ‘stewards’ of such remains; the ways
the past is narrated, preserved and forgotten all have to do with more general aspects
of an increasingly globalized “casino capitalism”9 whose imposed lifeworld leads to a
generalized disappearance of durability and unchangeability in human relations, but
also in relations between people and their material surroundings. This produces pow-
erful countercurrents, driven not just by fundamentalist religious convictions, but also
research agendas in academia, among them identity politics. These issues lie at the ori-
gin of our collection of essays as well as the workshop in ǠǞǟǟ in Berlin that has laid the
groundwork for it.10
This workshop was speciﬁcally meant to discuss Pierre Nora’s idea of lieux de mé-
moire and potential problems related to it. At the conference, three general problems
with the connection between memory and place were discussed. Firstly, when mem-
ory is materially concentrated in a speciﬁc place it is normally supposed to provide
positive points of identiﬁcation for a collectivity. However, following Lynn Meskell11
and Alfredo González-Ruibal12, lieux de mémoire can have negative connotations as well,
they can turn into places of abjection. How do places of commemoration change their
signiﬁcance and value? What are the political parameters that allow or prevent such
changes? On a more abstract level, the primary characteristic of places of memory is
the crystallization of collective memory in circumscribed places. Secondly, such often
monumentalized sites produce a highly uneven landscape of commemoration, one that
forces or attempts to force its audiences to perceive speciﬁc points as loaded with past
meaning while silencing others. How widespread is this topographic imbalance of am-
nesia and memory? What are the speciﬁc ways of remembering (in) a speciﬁc place in
order to forget another one? And can a similar dynamic be at work along temporal lines,
so that temporally speciﬁc acts of remembrance serve forgetfulness at other times? The
commodiﬁcation of memory was a third issue we had originally considered relevant.
However, this was not much discussed at the workshop and does not play an important
role in the papers that follow.
The contributors to this volume, many of whomwere participants in the workshop,
address notions of memory, geography, spatiality, and identity and the complex set of
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power differences that link them.While our initial call for papers was based on a speciﬁc
interest in scrutinizing the concept of lieux de mémoire, we soon realized that discourses
on and research traditions concerned with memory vary widely within academia, de-
pendent on language, national and cultural frames.13 One obvious reason for this ‘state
of the art’ is that the memory boom in scholarly circles is closely tied to interests outside
of universities. What manifests itself is a widely observable breakdown of walls between
politically driven discourses in civil society and supposedly neutral academic research. It
is perhaps not astonishing that the ﬁeld of memory studies is particularly prone to ten-
sions of this kind.14 Scholars who attempted to uphold the boundaries of the academic
ivory tower by declaring history to be strictly separate from memory were unsuccess-
ful.15 The contributions to this volume illustrate this impossibility rather than defend
it.
Ǡ Discourses on memories
The memory boom in social, cultural and biological sciences of recent times has led to
a tendency to identify ‘memory’ in almost any cultural expression, whether material or
not. As both Ruth Van Dyke and Astrid Erll have argued convincingly,16 its assumed
ubiquity has weakened the analytical and theoretical power of memory studies, ending
in a situation where phenomena that were hitherto subsumed under notions such as
tradition, culture, and even the material world transform into elements of ‘memory’.17
This raises the question of whether there is a need to deﬁne the difference between what
counts as memory (or related terms, from commemoration to recalling and forgetting)
and other phenomena of social and personal life.
What counts as being outside ‘memory’ for an archaeologist? Potentially, anything in
and from the past can be studied as part of a process that relates past and present – a dia-
chronic relationship. Maurice Halbwachs set memory and history apart by arguing that
in the realm of memory, the present is the dominant side, while historical disciplines
13 For instance, the Latin derived mémoire in French
and memory in English can be pluralized, something
that is alien to the German notion of Gedächtnis. In
the same vein, the difference between Erinnerung
and Gedächtnis cannot be expressed adequately in
French or English, while the association between
lieux and milieux remains foreign to German and
English – and here we only touch on three Western
European languages, with for example Turkish mak-
ing differences between anı, bellek, hatıra, and hafıza.
14 Lindenberger ǠǞǟǢ, ǡǦǧ–ǡǧǣ.
15 For example Nora ǟǧǦǧ; J. Assmann ǟǧǧǥ, ǥǥ.
16 Van Dyke ǠǞǟǡ, ǠǢǡ–ǠǢǣ; Erll ǠǞǟǟ; see also Row-
lands ǟǧǧǡ; Berliner ǠǞǞǣ.
17 For example, the introduction to an important vol-
ume on “memory work” reads partly like a descrip-
tion of Giddens’ concept of ‘structuration’, where
the notion of ‘structure’ is replaced with ‘memory’,
see Mills and Walker ǠǞǞǦa.
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give the past the primary place.18 At an extreme, such a stance requires a substantial in-
tellectual effort of de-contextualizing a researching self from his or her present concerns,
a process that has been theorized by EdmundHusserl in his elaboration of the notion of
epoché or bracketing. In the present intellectual climate, the very possibility of such an
endeavor is severely in doubt in the historical and cultural sciences,19 including in some
postprocessual strands of archaeology. Cornelius Holtorf almost entirely dismisses con-
cerns with the past and prefers to talk about “pastness”, largely as imagination.20 Such a
radical constructivist stance is problematic because of its lack of respect for past subjects:
their struggles and desires are judged to be irrelevant.21
A second problem stems from attempts at coming to grips with the aforementioned
ubiquity of memory. The literature on memories contains a variety of categorizations
of speciﬁc ‘kinds’ of memory. Below, we name only a few in order to highlight the
tremendous variability in deﬁnitions. Apparently, discourses are produced as if in splen-
did isolation, so that parallel attempts at deﬁning speciﬁc dimensions, ﬁelds of memory,
terminological subdivisions by scholars in various linguistically or nationally anchored
discourses can be observed.
ǡ Collective memory
One of themost frequentlymentioned boundaries is that between individual and collec-
tivememory, forcefully argued for byHalbwachs in his attempt at conceptualizingmem-
ory as an externalization. Halbwachs tried to distance himself from Sigmund Freud’s
deeply inﬂuential ideas of what one might call “internalized memory” with processes
such as “repression”,22 which lead to what Freud described as a generalized discontent
among individuals in all cultures: the need to repress some pleasures in order to adhere
to collective, cultural principles that allow the maintenance of a community.23 Most
scholars in the social sciences follow Halbwachs’ lead and stay far away from Freud’s
elaborations on memory.24 However, some of the readings of Halbwachs’ mémoire col-
lective distort his original intent. His idea of collective memory is often understood as
18 Echterhoff and Saar ǠǞǞǠ.
19 This is in part a result of ǠǞth century history itself.
Saul Friedländer states that a history of the Nazi
period, for example, must not be written without
losing the feeling of discomposure regarding the
dimensions of inhumanity; Friedländer ǠǞǞǥa, ǠǦ.
20 Holtorf ǠǞǟǡ.
21 On this problem of “diachronic violence”, see Bern-
beck ǠǞǟǣ, ǠǤǞ–ǠǤǡ.
22 Freud ǟǧǧǟ [ǟǧǟǣ].
23 Freud ǟǧǧǟ [ǟǧǡǞ]; see also Niethammer ǠǞǞǞ, ǡǢǠ–
ǡǢǧ.
24 But see A. Assmann who argues that cultural
reservoirs include “das Repertoire verpaßter
Möglichkeiten, alternativer Optionen und un-
genutzter Chancen” (a repertory of unrealized pos-
sibilities, alternative options and unused chances);
A. Assmann ǟǧǧǧ, ǟǡǥ.
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the product of a reiﬁed “group consciousness”.25 In fact, Halbwachs discusses extensively
how groups create, transmit, and change stories about their respective pasts through
individual actors’ practices: “the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in
individual memories”,26 and the concept of group memory is only used in a metaphor-
ical sense. Halbwachs’ cadres sociaux in which memory is present can best be translated
as social frames that describe the conditions and the social embeddedness of individual
memories, the active commemoration as opposed to memory in the form of a reﬂection
of some reality.
Halbwachs maintains that memories originate in a social context and that they are
retrieved and changed during interactions among people. Individual remembering thus
always happens in interaction with the memories of others.27 As a consequence, he
conceptualizes individual identity as constructed through constant reference and ac-
tualization of memories about individual pasts. This actualization of memories changes
them:28 they are embedded in new contexts, similar to the reuse of spolia in new build-
ings. In line with such an idea is Daniel L. Schacter’s description of individual remem-
bering as more selective and constructive than perception, because “our memories are
the fragile but powerful products of what we recall from the past, believe about the
present, and imagine about the future”.29 Even as internal acts of recalling, personal
memories – in German Erinnerungen, in French souvenirs – are based on the social or
collective framework of the present. The Halbwachsian concept of memory is nowadays
criticized not so much because it disregards the role of individual memories but because
it grants collective memory a foundational role. Relations where individual memories
and collective ones constitute each other are more realistic.
Ǣ Memory as container, memory as contained
Some concepts of memory can be termed ‘structural’, while others are focused on prac-
tices. The former often employ what one might call ‘container models’ of memory.
These come in two varieties, memory as containing and memory as contained.
The container model is at the core of Jan Assmann’s concepts of a “communica-
tive” and a “cultural memory”. He is mainly interested in written traditions and the role
25 For example Fentress and Wickham ǟǧǧǠ, ǟǟǞ; Gedi
and Elam ǟǧǧǤ; Crane ǟǧǧǥ, ǟǡǥǡ; see also Forty
ǟǧǧǧ, Ǡ; Mills and Walker ǠǞǞǦa, ǣ–ǥ.
26 Halbwachs ǟǧǧǠ [ǟǧǣǞ], ǢǞ; compare with Crane
ǟǧǧǥ.
27 Halbwachs ǟǧǧǠ [ǟǧǣǞ], ǡǦ: “most of the time, when
I remember, it is others who spur me on; their
memory comes to the aid of mine and mine relies
on theirs.”
28 Halbwachs ǟǧǧǠ [ǟǧǣǞ], Ǣǥ; see also Halbwachs ǠǞǞǡ
[ǟǧǢǟ].
29 Schacter ǟǧǧǤ, ǡǞǦ.
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communicative memory cultural memory
content experience of history in the framework of
individual biographies
mythical history of origins, events
of an “absolute past”
form informal, generated through unreﬂected
practices, quotidian
constructed, high degree of for-
mality, ceremonial communica-
tions, feasting
media living memory in “organic memories”,
experiences and hearsay
ﬁxed objectivation, traditional
symbolic codiﬁcation, mis en scène
in word, image, dance, etc.
carrier unspeciﬁc, witnesses of a memory commu-
nity
experts of traditions and memory
(scientists, priests, etc.)
temporal structure 80–100 years, a present that moves along
with 3–4 generations of memory
absolute past of a mythical time of
origins
Tab. ǟ The communicative and cultural dimensions of collective memory. After J. Assmann, with modiﬁcations
after Leipold ǠǞǟǣ, ǟǤ Abb. ǟ; cf. J. Assmann ǟǧǦǦ, ǟǡ–ǟǣ; J. Assmann ǟǧǧǥ, ǣǤ.
past events play in maintaining group identity; he sees memory cultures as literally con-
structing communities.30 J. Assmann cites Cicero, who describes barbarous peoples as
having no memories and living in and for the moment. For J. Assmann, the ancient Is-
raelites stand as the primordial example of a group that kept its identity in the long run
by subjecting themselves to the dictum of ‘observe and remember’. He posits that the
existence of an observed ‘past’, different from the present, must necessarily entail a break
with tradition that opens the space for constructions, negation, forgetting and repres-
sion. Giorgio Agamben elaborates on the full consequences of this: the past as an object
explicitly separated from the present becomes a site of accumulation.31 A problem with
such an objectivized conception of memory is that it describes societies in which tradi-
tions play a dominant role as ahistoric and incapable of any reﬂection about their past,
echoing historicist prejudices of the ǟǧth century.32
J. Assmann’s ideas of memory as a container become fully visible in his interpreta-
tion of material culture, which, just as language, functions as one major dimension of
memory, albeit a passive one. Material culture frames people, and its endurance enables
materiality to transmit meaning across generations. This is another main element in his
writings about memory. The difference in diachronic transmission between oral com-
munication and material elements of cultural life, especially textual materials, is used to
separate a “communicative” from a “cultural” memory (see Tab. ǟ).
30 J. Assmann ǟǧǧǥ, ǡǞ–ǡǟ. 31 Agamben ǠǞǟǠ, ǟǢǠ–ǟǢǦ.
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functional memory (Funktionsgedächtnis) stored memory (Speichergedächtnis)
linked to a speciﬁc group without speciﬁc social anchoring, universal
links past and present because of an interest in the future separates past and present for the sake of explo-
ration of the past
selective non-selective
transmission of identity-related values, oriented towards
the production of meaning
search for truth, relativization of norms and values
sacralized disenchanted
Tab. Ǡ Differences between functional and stored memory. According to A. Assmann ǟǧǧǧ, ǟǡǡ.
In J. Assmann’s conceptualization, both kinds of memory envelop societies. Language
is thought of as a quasi-independently existing means to communicate, a langue with-
out the need for parole. Material culture, as image, text, or in other forms, is our daily
inescapable framework of life, and as such part of a background of unproblematized
and unproblematizable memory. Such a conception of memory produces a strong ten-
dency towards reiﬁcation, while dynamic relations between people and things are un-
derplayed.
Another conceptual take on externalized memory describes it as contained. Aleida
Assmann understands memory as a “Speicher, aus dem die Erinnerung auswählt, ak-
tualisiert, sich bedient”.33 The theoretical background is an objectivist, and thereby re-
ductionist information theory. In such cases, book and computer are used as metaphors
for memory; the practice of remembering is imagined as an act of reaching into a stor-
age box ﬁlled with mémoires as bits of information. This ‘contained’ concept of memory
may be applicable to the work of historians and archaeologists, but Andrew Jones criti-
cizes its generalization and projection into the past as unrealistic and reductionist.34 A.
Assmann further distinguishes between a “stored” and a “functional memory”. She thus
adds another aspect to memory, but one equally instrumental to the storage idea.
A. Assmann’s division would be useful if it did not contain strong evolutionary el-
ements that seem highly problematic to us. She contends that memories in purely oral
cultures are solely “functional memories”, and thus simply oriented towards the upkeep
of collective identities. This implies that such cultures have no possibilities for critique.
32 Sommer ǠǞǟǢ.
33 “A storage from which memory selects, updates
and serves itself”, A. Assmann ǟǧǧǧ, ǟǤǞ (translation
R. B.).
34 Jones ǠǞǞǥ, Ǥ–ǟǠ.
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However, ethnographies show that oral traditions are in a constant state of transforma-
tion, that they often include multifarious competing strains, some of which stand in
tension with each other.35 Memory can be social or collective only if it is capable of
being articulated and transmitted.36 This implies that social memory depends on com-
municative practices and is the reasonwhy collectivememory is usuallymore formalized
than individual memory: for transmission, conventionalization and simpliﬁcation are
needed.37 While canonization is often observed for past cultures, it is a bit ironic that
exactly that labor is carried out by theoreticians of memory themselves, such as Nora.
Instead, the conventionalization of memory is a process that should be investigated as
opening a ﬁeld for contention over various strands of memory, for example the role of
“material mnemonics” in everyday life that are not necessarily monumentalized.38
ǣ Memory practices
The risk of reiﬁcation of memory is much less apparent in practice-oriented approaches.
Embodiment as an element of social memory may have its roots in the philosophy
of Henri Bergson39 but has been most inﬂuentially articulated by Paul Connerton.40
Starting from the question of the transmission of collective memory, Connerton as-
serts that incorporated rather than inscribed memory is essential for a tradition’s un-
broken survival. This “habit memory”41 is mainly an embodied one, and performances
of commemoration, for instance in formalized rituals, reproduce larger structures. This
practice-based approach to collectivememory avoids the overdrawn dichotomy between
oral and script-based cultures.42 Barbara Mills and William Walker’s compendium as
well as Maria Starzmann and John Roby’s recent volume are good examples of an ap-
plication of Connerton’s ideas to archaeology.43 The contributions in these volumes
focus on commemorative rituals, on exceptional situations, practices of marginalizing
and representing remembrances, but only partly on daily activities.
Not all human practices need to be primarily embodied, however. Personal recall is
certainly one neglected element of “memorywork”,44 and, as Jones argues, it is a “process
of evocation indexed by objects”, in effect “a process distributed between people and
objects”.45 Such acts of recalling can also have the character of a commemoration, an
act of ethically imposed remembering. For Jones, memory is neither an external entity
35 For example Conﬁno ǟǧǧǥ, ǟǡǧǦ–ǟǢǞǞ; Barth ǠǞǞǠ.
36 Cf. Jäger ǠǞǞǢ.
37 Fentress and Wickham ǟǧǧǠ, Ǣǥ.
38 Lillios and Tsamis ǠǞǟǞ; Choyke ǠǞǞǧ.
39 See Rölli ǠǞǞǢ.
40 Connerton ǟǧǦǧ.
41 Connerton ǟǧǦǧ, Ǡǡ.
42 See also Battaglia ǟǧǧǠ.
43 Mills and Walker ǠǞǞǦb; Starzmann and Roby ǠǞǟǤ.
44 Mills and Walker ǠǞǞǦb.
45 Jones ǠǞǞǥ, ǠǤ.
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that can be described and analyzed largely without recourse to the speciﬁcities of those
who remember, nor an internalized phenomenon with performative potentials. Rather,
memory itself is fundamentally relational.
The underdetermined nature of memory as a set of relations needs more explo-
ration. Repetitive and evocative practices that we classify as a part of presencing the past
are multifarious and variable. It is exactly the openness of such memory relations that
makes the subject important. What are the conditions under which individual, inter-
nal, and internalized memories are streamlined into entities that support and constitute
communities rather than tearing them apart?
These considerations bring us to an important issue in our collection of essays. The
contributions address spontaneous evocation as one aspect ofmemory (Moshenska), but
also its reverse – politically engineered memory constructions. Not too long ago, Alon
Conﬁno46 argued against a politicization of memory in academic studies in a discussion
of memory in the frame of the ǠǞth century. In our view, explorations of commemora-
tive structures and practices actually underplay their political dimension. At least, this
is the case in those areas of archaeology that deal with the ancient past.47 To reserve
the term ‘collective memory’ for large-scale, official commemorative rituals and speak
of ‘social memory’ as similar practices on a smaller scale will not do.48 The insistence
on investigating multiple memory strands as opposed to one “kulturelles Großgedächt-
nis”49 is not helpful either – at least not as long as relations of power are excluded from
the discussion.
Memories are social, and even if formalized, they are always manifold, constantly
changing and contested. This political character and connected issues are investigated
by the authors in this volume. We have structured the contributions according to the
speciﬁc types of diachronic power relations analyzed. The ﬁrst part is concerned with
what onemight call “the past in the past”.50 Attempts at identifyingmodes of remember-
ing, of reconstructing relations between space, identity and (passing) time, of historical
changes in these complex relations are heavily dependent on the sources at our disposal.
Thus, for historical periods, memory, practices of remembering, but especially the ideo-
logical character of these practices can be reconstructed with more conﬁdence than for
prehistoric cases, provided that the elitist character of most early writing is taken into ac-
count. A second set of papers problematizes our own present understandings of the ‘past
in the past’. Contemporary concerns range from critiques of academia to histories of a
46 Conﬁno ǟǧǧǥ.
47 The set of interesting papers in Starzmann and
Roby ǠǞǟǤ has an activist bent. Notably, almost
all of them discuss cases from the ǟǦth to Ǡǟst
centuries.
48 Mills and Walker ǠǞǞǦa.
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mnemonic discourse. Finally, a third section investigates constructions of memory. Au-
thors variously take affirmative and critical approaches. As one might expect, museums
play an important role in these discussions, as do cultural heritage and its preservation.
Temporal relations are crosscut by spatial ones. Most contributions discuss in detail the
situation of memory in space, distributions and spatial hierarchies of remembering, but
also obfuscations and othermechanisms that prevent the concentration of remembering
and associated practices in one single location.
Ǥ Forgetting and disremembering
Forgetting cannot be exercised intentionally, it happens to us. In contrast, remember-
ing is an act that can be induced through a variety of media.51 On an individual level,
the fundamental imbalance between these two processes is fairly clear. Sybille Krämer
mentions Immanuel Kant’s famous paradoxical note about his servant, “[t]he name of
Lampe must now be entirely forgotten”.52 The commitment to memory of the intent to
forget has the opposite result – and, as argued above, this is also true for monuments
of externalized memory. Inversely, the explicit externalization of what one wants to re-
member in the form of a text, a tomb, or a monument is in itself already an act of
forgetting, as are mindlessly conducted rituals, for example the laying down of wreaths
by politicians at public memorials. In her paper Sommer points out how even monu-
mental prehistoric tombs were closed, masked and forgotten as part of their ‘normal’
life-cycle. In the case she describes, the acts of building and burial may have been more
important than the monument itself, which failed to conveniently rot away, however.
Externalized memory comes close to the ‘container’ concept discussed above, be-
cause it relieves us from the pressure to remember: means of commemoration are roads
to forgetfulness. Othermeans of forgetting belong to the realm of political economy. For
instance, declarations of a monument as ‘world cultural heritage’ are a typical hinge that
leads to massive forgetting through commoditization. In our volume, Gabriel Moshen-
ska presents such a case and argues that archaeological excavations as transitory perfor-
mances can break this mechanism, albeit only momentarily.
Krämer points out another side of forgetfulness. There are practices of willful
dis-remembering, her example being the ancient Greek amnesty as intentional non-
remembrance of the misdeeds of oligarchs in the years ǢǞǢ to ǢǞǡ BCE.53 As Starzmann
argues, such “unremembering” needs to be distinguished from forgetting.54 Intentional
oblivion is always a political act. Sommer’s and González-Ruibal’s contribution to this
51 Cf. Eco ǟǧǦǦ.
52 Krämer ǠǞǞǞ, ǠǣǢ.
53 Krämer ǠǞǞǞ, ǠǣǢ–Ǡǣǣ.
54 Starzmann ǠǞǟǤ, ǟǠ–ǟǡ.
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volume highlight the multiple dimensions of such acts of oblivion. Sommer argues that
the past can be perceived as dangerous, in her case the barrows in which the dead of
older periods were buried. The bodies of the dead themselves were not the main dan-
ger but rather the places of their burial. Neutralization happened through new burials,
accompanied by symbolically signiﬁcant material culture items. In González-Ruibal’s
case, “unremembering” concerns the different roles of perpetrators and victims in the
Spanish civil war. They are leveled through memory practices. Memory becomes decen-
tered so that the past of those who strove for justice and equality is rendered indistin-
guishable from a past of those who built the Spanish concentration camps, committed
mass murder and established a dictatorship. The result is a kulturelles Großgedächtnis, a
large-scale cultural memory that levels all political differences. Not only the memory of
past roles of people, memory itself is manipulated to the point of disremembering. Not
amnesty but amnesia.
The relation betweenmemory and forgetting has also been conceptualized by posit-
ing an imbalance between the two: commemoration of speciﬁc events, people, and
structures always and necessarily leads to the forgetting of others. This is what Walter
Benjaminmeant when he said, “there is no document of culture which is not at the same
time a document of barbarism”.55 This speciﬁc type of forgetting is not a relief from the
pressure to remember, but rather a politics of active silencing, so forcefully described by
Michel-Rolph Trouillot for Haiti.56 In our collection, Brian Broadrose elaborates on the
complexities of these mnemonic processes and points out the dominant dimension that
produces the effect of a zero-sum-game: power and differences of power. As he shows,
archaeology, and academics in general, are deeply enmeshed in these practices of for-
getting, producing discourses of others’ (dis)interest in their own past. He emphasizes
the production of a privileged access to the past through the creation of delegitimiz-
ing discourses that aim at alternatives. Scholarly attempts at making memory resurface
through archaeological excavation can at the same time serve exactly the opposite end.
Van Dyke discusses a parallel case from the U.S. Southwest. Joachim Baur’s analysis of
immigration museums, and particularly of Ellis Island in New York, shifts from verbal
discourse to material exhibits and points out that harmonizing, ‘romantic’ displays of a
migratory entry to North America via New York City hands over to oblivion the much
more cruel forced migration experiences of African-Americans on slave ships. Overall,
Freud’s notion of (psychological) repression is closely related to such practices of schol-
arly, institutional, and social silencing: in these spheres as well, speciﬁc kinds of memory
are pushed aside and peripheralized. However, they remain hidden and may reappear
in unpredictable places under unforeseeable conditions and at random moments.
55 Benjamin ǟǧǤǦ, ǠǣǤ. 56 Trouillot ǟǧǧǣ.
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ǥ Spatializations of memory: networks and sites
Forgetting and disremembering are not only played out in discourses, they also have
important spatial and temporal dimensions. One of the main tenets of the workshop
that was at the origin of this book was a concern with what one might call ‘spatialized
silencing’. In his contribution, Christopher Ten Wolde discusses “human spaces” and
notes how he uses pedagogical means to share and create meanings of and in places,
revealing their layering and multidimensionality. Proceeding dialectically, we might
ask whether there are any places without meanings. For the French historian Nora, the
answer is an assured yes; his concept of lieux de mémoire, memory sites or ‘realms of mem-
ory’, is based on the idea that memory coagulates around speciﬁc topoi, around places,
metaphors, events, and other phenomena. Memory is an empty term, it is in need of
speciﬁcation, and Nora uses the notion of a lieu to achieve this historical precision and
set it apart from those milieux de mémoire which he considers lost to the incisive critique
of historians. The centralization of memories in a speciﬁc place is an ideological act of
consolidation, especially when the content of such memory is negatively related to a
collectivity. Modern national collectivities handle a war defeat by relegating its remem-
brance to a speciﬁc place, such as the Vietnam Memorial in Washington D.C., with the
effect that this event can be forgotten elsewhere. The German artist Gunter Demnig’s
project of Stolpersteine or ‘stumbling stones’ counters such tendencies. He has installed
tens of thousands of small metal plaques with names, dates of birth, deportation and
murder of Jews and other victims of the Nazi terror in cities across Europe. Stolpersteine
constitute a dense network of memory that reminds a collectivity of mass murder com-
mitted by generations whose last members are still alive. The small metal plaques pro-
duce sudden encounters with this past in daily life and at unforeseen locations, they are
thus the exact opposite of lieux de mémoire.57
Our age is not the ﬁrst to associate memory with space. It is common knowledge
that the idea of loci in connection with memory is due to Simonides of Keos, as elabo-
rated by Cicero in De Oratore. Events and their details can be remembered best through
a spatial visualization, so the claim goes. Thus, the function of ‘memory sites’ lies in pro-
viding continuity and support for common pasts and a collective identity – in Nora’s
opinion ﬁrmly attached to the national scale.
But isn’t the highly selective combination of place, identity and memory with the
goal of supporting collective identities another dimension of silencing? Several papers
discuss, re-work, and criticize Nora’s vision of memory concentration, mainly under-
standing “lieu” in the literal sense of place/space. Van Dyke shows how Chaco Canyon
produces a complex set of memories through its inscription in a landscape, an effect that
57 Jordan ǠǞǞǤ, ǟǧǟ–ǟǧǣ.
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is realized through bodily perceptions. It is ‘visceral’ and thus largely independent from
Nora’s discourse-centered histories of localized memory. The narrative dimension of
such places is highlighted in Bernd Steinbock’s and Simon Lentzsch’s papers. While
Steinbock elaborates on the variability of local memories as a basis of a pyramid of
higher-order memories, the apogee of which was a large, uniﬁed Athenian narrative,
Lentzsch explains why the exaggeration of a disaster can solidify a foundational mem-
ory. Both are cases of antique genealogies for truly encompassing cultural memories,
the kulturelle Großgedächtnisse of ancient Athens and Rome, respectively.
Spatial dimensions are addressed in very different ways by Baur and Ariane Ballmer.
Memory is contained doubly in museums such as those described by Baur. Museum au-
thenticity, produced by using original locations and structures, such as Pier Ǡǟ in Canada
and Ellis Island in the U.S., turns the structures themselves into externalized memory
containing objects from an immigrant past. However, this museological strategy still
remains exclusionist because of its excision of those who arrived in North America as
slaves. Whole landscapes can also ‘contain’ memories, but Ballmer presents a case where
many separate and singular acts of deposition of objects produce an unplanned and im-
perceptible mnemoscape. For those living in such a mnemoscape, there would have been
a general knowledge that it was ﬁlled with hidden meanings and that speciﬁc people
could add continually to that meaning. In some ways, we can compare the resulting
relation between past subjects and their environment to what Martin Pollack describes
for ǠǞth century central Europe as “contaminated landscapes”, entire regions where one
can be sure to walk through spaces of collective past crimes of contempt, torture, and
annihilation – but single historical events may often remain unknown.58
Spatial authenticity is an important element in Ballmer’s mnemoscapes, landscapes
of hiding things and perhaps events. A basic argument is the unrepresentability of place.
The meanings, characteristics, and details of one place cannot be substituted with an-
other. This runs counter to the idea of the museum, a concept that is a materialization of
lieux de mémoire because it consists of a concentration of things that originally belonged
elsewhere. Baur’s critique of immigration museums hinges on this point: the museum
building may well be at an authentic site, but its interior pretends to represent other
kinds of immigrants whose fates contrast starkly with those on whose history the mu-
seum is based. Heidrun Derks uses a lucid discussion of the lieux de mémoire to fend off
the idea that this could be a useful concept for the Kalkriese Museum, with the burden
of ǠǞǞǞ years of changing nationalistic and other discursive constructions around the
Roman officer Arminius. While her and Reinhard Bernbeck’s critique of the concept
stay close to Nora’s original idea that such lieux have their own historiographic dimen-
sion, other contributors such as Moshenska clearly view this aspect as unimportant.
58 Pollack ǠǞǟǢ.
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Not all spatial conﬁgurations should be thought of as equal or equally authentic.
Bestowing the same degree of importance on all places in a network would be the op-
posite of Nora’s intent. González-Ruibal criticizes the idea that memory is inherent in
whole landscapes by pointing out a political dimension: they ﬁt into a neoliberal ‘all
sites are equal’-ideology. Such a pseudo-democratic attitude allows the leveling of dif-
ferences in commemorated content. In a commodiﬁed mnemoscape, perpetrators of war
crimes and their victims appear in similar ways, even in the same spot.59
Most approaches to the spatial dimension of memory start from the premise that its
spatialization is a straightforward process whereby markings are inscribed into a land-
scape. Ballmer and Bernbeck argue that there are complex alternatives. Instead of an-
choring memory explicitly and materially in a real space so that a site can be regularly
revisited, Ballmer discusses Bronze Age landscapes in the High Alps that actively created
invisibility, places whose general presence may have been known but whose exact posi-
tion remained unclear, disenabling revisiting and any establishment of place-anchored
rituals of commemoration. Bernbeck argues that there are actively created in-between
spaces. Jordanian dolmen resemble Homi Bhabha’s “third spaces”.60 The effect of such
spaces is similar to that of Ballmer’s High Alps example: intentional obfuscation fol-
lowed by the impossibility of any sense of spatial authenticity prevents the development
of ritualistic, repetitive commemorative practices.
Ǧ Memory and time, duration and history
We have set memory apart from history because of its ﬁrm placement in the present.
Memory is concerned with our own condition and functionalizes the past for this pur-
pose. It would be wrong to keep up a stark divide between this deﬁnition of memory
and history as a more sober activity that is concerned with the past for the past’s sake.
Lentzsch argues that Roman historywas a hyperbolic narrative whose intent was an indi-
rect comparison with ancient Athens. The background is political: Rome’s hegemonic
relationship with Athens. The problematic nature of a strict division between history
and memory is apparent in Van Dyke’s chapter on Hopi and Navajo pasts. They may be
called ‘memory’ rather than history from an academic historian’s or archaeologist’s per-
spective, but archaeologists may also judge that these two collective memories are not
equally close to (or far from) historical accounts. Since archaeologists have their own
ideas about the past, Van Dyke shows the wide-ranging consequences of two different,
academically produced scenarios (‘acculturation’ vs. ‘refugee’) and their concrete conse-
quences for people traditionally associated with the region. This case casts serious doubt
59 A case in point is Berlin’s Neue Wache. 60 Bhabha ǟǧǧǢ.
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on the reliability of history’s own basis for judgment, on the presumed greater objec-
tivity of history when compared to the subjectivity of memory. In Broadrose’s account,
these deeply ideological, twisted characteristics of academic scholarship come to the fore
more clearly than in any other paper of our volume. Neither history nor memory can
lay any claim to truthfulness. Both Van Dyke’s and Broadrose’s papers also implicitly
raise the issue of linear chronology as a scientiﬁc measure for today’s world. Since his-
tory is more and more enmeshed in public debate, the standard of rights to a territory
derived from chronological rather thanmnemonic anteriority can simply not be upheld
as legitimate.
A politics of time pervades Bernbeck’s account of the temporal dimension of his
interpretation of Third Spaces. The archaeological phenomenon he describes deﬁes clear
chronological positioning despite decades of research. In this case, material monumen-
tality does not serve to anchor speciﬁc memories – it serves to mark an absence. Ar-
chaeological efforts to interpret megaliths as places of ancestor veneration ﬁt Michel
de Certeau’s description of memory: “Like those birds that lay their eggs only in other
species’ nests, memory produces in a place that does not belong to it. It receives its form
and its implantation from external circumstances, even if it furnishes the content (the
missing detail).”61
Time is not only addressed or criticized in this volume as a linear dimension of
past-present-future. Some contributions conceptualize duration and temporal speed as
essential elements of memory. Ten Wolde sees in archaeology the guardian of “lasting
meaning”, of longue durée itself. He sets it into an age where hyperfast change brings with
it a longing for views of an unchanging world.62 Moshenska points out that this durative
characteristic of archaeology lends itself all too well to a commodiﬁcation of the past.
The precondition for the socio-cultural production of the tourist as a ﬁgure complete
with a speciﬁc habitus is based on a globalized, alienated monumentality and its need
for packaging.
Not all materiality encloses a longue durée and monumental scale, however. Daniel
Miller made the important observation that there is a basic temporal relationship be-
tween things and human life.63 When shorter than human life, he calls things “tran-
sient” and sets them apart from those with “longevity” (longer than human lives)64 and
“equivalence” (more or less the same duration). Here, duration is not measured as ab-
solute, linear time. Rather, one may speak of a ‘relational duration’. Ballmer’s landscape
of invisibilities is a good example for past people’s manipulation of relational duration:
they shortened the longevity of bronze objects through speciﬁc depositional practices.
61 De Certeau ǟǧǦǢ, ǦǤ.
62 Han ǠǞǞǧ.
63 Miller ǟǧǧǢ, ǢǞǧ–ǢǟǢ.
64 For example, as “temporal surplus” of things: Pol-
lock and Bernbeck ǠǞǟǞ.
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On the other hand, Baur’s immigration museums transform transient, quotidian ob-
jects into things with a long-term duration. The case of Museum and Park Kalkriese is
even more complex. The narratives surrounding the site provide fertile ground for mon-
umentalizing associations by a large public. The importance of the ǠǞǞǞ-year-old battle
where Quinctilius Varus lost his life has been so intensely and frequently reworked dis-
cursively and politically that the museum must try to de-monumentalize a site that was
not monumental in the ﬁrst place. Derks describes some of the ingenious means to do
so: depicting one and the same event in two radically different ways, one focusing on
the moment of fear, the other on organizational issues, reduces the temporal framing of
the battle to a bloody slaughter in a forest, rather than the foundational day of a nation.
ǧ Conﬂicts over memory
A further point of this volume is that collective memories cannot simply be under-
stood as a uniﬁed and uncontested sphere of social life, the aforementioned kulturelles
Großgedächtnis. Memory “is as much a result of conscious manipulation as unconscious
absorption and it is always mediated”.65 The assumption that good history produces a
uniﬁed, coherent narrative is a further important difference to traditional understand-
ings of memory, which is multifarious. However, postmodern historiography also ac-
cepts multiple versions of one and the same narrative, even in highly disputed cases
such as the Holocaust.66 We have already mentioned Derks’ description of the Kalkriese
museum which presents several versions of the same battle.
Memory is not only diverse and disputed in the present, as Steinbock shows for
the case of ancient Athens. But while the Athenians’ disputes over memory were read-
ily solved – if we believe the documentation available –, social and especially religious
memories are often fought over, even violently. Particularly problematic are sites with
religious or ideological connotations. Ayodhya in northern India is a well-known case,
similar to the complexity and religiously-politically charged topography of Jerusalem.
In both cases, archaeologists have been and are deeply implied in cruel and bloody con-
ﬂicts.67 For Greece, Yannis Hamilakis has devoted an entire book to sharp conﬂicts over
social memories and the associated abuse of archaeology.68
Gabi Dolff-Bonekämper has discussed this phenomenon as an amendment to
Nora’s lieux demémoire and calls places associatedwithmemory conﬂict lieux de discorde,69
65 Kansteiner ǠǞǞǠ, ǟǦǞ.
66 Friedländer ǠǞǞǥa; Friedländer ǠǞǞǥb.
67 See among others, Bernbeck and Pollock ǠǞǞǢ, ǡǢǢ–
ǡǢǧ.
68 Hamilakis ǠǞǞǥ.
69 „Sites of dispute”, Orte des Dissens. – Dolff-
Bonekämper ǠǞǞǠ, ǠǢǥ; Dolff-Bonekämper ǠǞǞǡ.
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a term picked up explicitly in the contributions by Van Dyke and Moshenska. Perspec-
tives on the kinds of contestation over memory vary widely. Some authors such as Baur
and Van Dyke talk about commemorative disputes as outsiders who observe them from
a distance. Others, for instance Moshenska and González-Ruibal, want to use archaeol-
ogy to instigate such disputes in the ﬁrst place, but for different reasons. One is the use
of archaeology as a discipline that can provoke the consciousness of mnemonic differ-
ences by excavating problematic sites such as a ﬁghter plane in the middle of London
(Moshenska), another the exposure of places of war, violence, and injustice that a cul-
ture of reconciliation tries to level and cover up (González-Ruibal). Broadrose writes
from the position of a minority whose sharply different ways of remembering, whose
whole lifeways are largely suppressed. In most of these cases, memory is imbued with
a deeply political dimension of repression. Dolff-Bonekämper speaks of the “discord
value” (Streitwert)70 of landscapes and monuments. This sounds as if some concrete
places have a higher, others a lower potential for fruitful disputes. However, such an
approach to conﬂicts over memory presumes what we might call a level playing ﬁeld
of memories. This is a somewhat unrealistic scenario, and it is entirely untenable when
considering the situation in Syria and northern Iraq at the time this volume goes to
press.
Memory politics sharply divide people, and people mobilize memory politics to
create social rifts. We as archaeologists cannot but be drawn into these games. However,
we have the task to develop a disciplinary activism that tries to get us out of this situa-
tion. The time between the original workshop and the publication of this volume has
brought with it a dramatic increase in violence and destruction of commemorative sites
and monuments, with devastating consequences for the civilians living in their vicin-
ity. May the future hold better, more peaceful prospects for people who engage with
memory and archaeology.
70 Dolff-Bonekämper ǠǞǟǞ, ǡǡ–ǡǢ.
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